Anamorphic Encryption Messaging
The People's Signal explores a coercion-resistant messaging model where one ciphertext can carry both an innocuous message and a hidden real message, enabling plausible deniability under surveillance pressure.
Two plaintext intentions are encoded into one transmitted ciphertext and diverge at reception.
Journalist
Source
Why this product
Mainstream encrypted messaging focuses on confidentiality during transit. In coercive settings, adversaries may still force device access or key disclosure. The People's Signal targets this threat model by supporting communication that remains deniable even when standard keys are exposed.
How It Works
The concept builds on anamorphic encryption: ciphertexts are computationally indistinguishable from traditional public-key encryption outputs, while embedding hidden payloads recoverable only with a separately shared double key.
Users exchange anamorphic public keys and establish a double key through a secure channel.
Sender creates one ciphertext containing both overt and covert messages.
Recipient decrypts overt content with standard key, then covert content with the double key.
Double-message scenarios
Each exchange carries an overt message that remains safe to reveal under inspection and a covert message recoverable only by trusted recipients with the shared double key.
Security goals
Encrypted traffic should appear equivalent to standard ciphertexts to outside observers.
Users can reveal standard keys and overt messages without exposing covert communication.
Only intended recipients with the shared double key can recover hidden payloads.
Use cases
Protect source communications where device seizure or key disclosure is a realistic threat.
Enable resilient coordination among activists and NGOs in hostile information environments.
Maintain plausible deniability in disclosures involving sensitive political or institutional abuse.
Current status
The People's Signal is currently a research-to-product initiative grounded in our paper "The People's Signal: Secure Messaging Against Surveillance and Coercion" (SACMAT'26 submission draft). We are refining protocol hardening, UX assumptions, and deployment pathways for pilot environments.
